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ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS IN CANADA: A




Individual aboriginal communities are unique in many ways
and, while wholly divergent in terms of specific histories, nev-
ertheless they share common values and needs. Due to political
impotence, societal differences, lack of acculturation, and lack
of wealth, the aboriginal community has come to rely on the
federal government.' Specifically, Indians depend on the federal
government to manage resources and funds and broker their
relationships with entities of the dominant society, such as states
and municipal governments.
Aboriginals maintain an extremely close spiritual connection
to the land, since it is the land that forms the basis for cultural
distinctiveness and specific status. 2 Land is almost always a focal
point for tribal sovereignty, because in most countries whatever
power tribes have can only be exercised over their own land.
3
Protection of the land base is a major issue among aboriginal
peoples today since without land they have no resources and no
ability to practice their subsistence economies, much less develop
a modem economy. Therefore, much of aboriginal law revolves
around the dispute and resolution of land claims.
The European nations claimed that discovery of a land in-
habited by aboriginal peoples vested title in the discovering
nations, with rights of use and occupancy held by the Indians.
Exclusion of all other nations gives the discovering nation the
absolute right to acquire land from the natives. 4 This concept
* B.S., 1987, Southern Connecticut State University; J.D., 1990, Catholic Uni-
versity of America-Columbus School of Law. Judicial clerk for the Hon. Fred B. Ugast,
Chief Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Third place award, 1988-89 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
I. Henderson, Litigating Native Claims, 19 LAw Soc. GAzmr 177, 177 (1984).
2. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
3. Newton, Enforcing the Federal Trust Relationship After Mitchell, 31 CATH.
U.L. Rnv. 635, 638 (1982) [hereinafter Trust Relationship].
4. Erickson, Aboriginal Land Rights in the United States and Canada, 60 N.D.L.
Rnv. 107, 109 (1984).
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protected Indian land rights as well as the principle of federal
exclusivity in dealing with Indians. The seizure of power gave
rise to the argument that title to aboriginal land creates a type
of fiduciary relationship obligating the government to undertake
the care of the Indians. In Canada, the provisions of the doctrine
of discovery were incorporated into the Royal Proclamation of
1763; in the United States, the doctrine is frequently referred to
and relied upon in court opinions.5
The executive, the legislatures, and the judiciaries of modern
nations have struggled to mark the boundaries and assess the
legal consequences of this unique relationship between the sov-
ereign and the aboriginal community. Nevertheless, the inter-
national law community has never directly addressed the rights
of aboriginal or native peoples, because aboriginal communities
are not regarded as sovereign states in either international law
or international forums.6 Rather, there is a pervasive tendency
to deny the existence of aboriginal rights and, to an extent, the
existence of aboriginals themselves. What emerges is a reliance
on a composite of rules and principles and to some degree,
traditions to react to the specific needs of the aboriginal com-
munity.
This note examines the fiduciary relationship between the
aboriginal community and the sovereign in Canada. The note
will begin with a brief discussion of aboriginal rights in general.
Because of historical and legislative developments, and the sim-
ilarity in dealing with native peoples, United States Indian law
is an obvious backdrop against which to consider Canadian
policy. In addition, Canadian courts frequently cite, though do
not always follow, United States case law. For this reason, a
brief summary of the treatment of aboriginal rights by the
United States courts is included. This note will then present an
analysis of the social, legislative, and judicial history of the
fiduciary relationship in Canada.
Aboriginal Rights in General
By definition, aboriginal land title is a nontreaty possessory
form of property right inuring to native peoples by virtue of
continuous occupation since time immemorial. 7 Under this doc-
5. Id. at 112.
6. Slattery, The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada, 32 Am. J.
Comp. L. 361, 373 (1984).





trine, title vests in the sovereign with the right of use and
occupancy established in the band or tribe." Neither legislative
fiat nor governmental grace creates these rights. Rather, they
are preexisting. rights solely retained by the incident of the
original and continuous possession. 9
A principal characterization of aboriginal land is limited al-
ienability. These lands are alienable solely to the sovereign.'0 In
Canada, surrender to the government is required prior to alien-
ation so as to interpose the Crown between the Indians and
prospective purchasers or lessees in order to protect against
exploitation of the Indians." The surrender concept is not as
clearly articulated in United States Indian law but is present,
nevertheless.
In addition to limited alienability, aboriginal land title is
susceptible to extinguishment by the sovereign without compen-
sation or even explanation. These provisions afford a mechanism
for retention of control over the land (and over the aboriginals
themselves) while segregating the rights of ownership and oc-
cupancy. According to the rule first articulated in Tee-Hit Ton
v. United States'2 and followed in Canada by St. Catherine's
Milling,3 the property interheld by the Indians is merely pos-
sessory, subject to the overriding interest of the federal govern-
ment and not requiring compensation for extinguishment. It is
the segregation of ownership and occupation rights which nec-
essarily gives rise to the fiduciary relationship between the sov-
ereign and the aboriginal peoples. In other words, the courts
have reasoned that since the land is only alienable to the sov-
ereign and subject to arbitrary termination, the power of the
sovereign embodies the responsibility to act in the best interest
of the Indians.
The attributes of inalienability and discretionary termination
flow logically from the doctrine of discovery,' 4 which is enthu-
siastically embraced by both the United States and Canada and
which has enormous impact on the concept of aboriginal title.
The doctrine of discovery means that the interest of the Indians
is merely one of occupancy arising out of possession, with the
result being that the discovering nation unilaterally gained an
8. Id. at 323.
9. Id.
10. Erickson, supra note 4, at 121.
11. Id.
12. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
13. 13 S.C.R. 557 (1887), 144 App. D.C. 46 (1888).
14. Erickson, supra note 4, at 127.
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absolute title to the land. As previously stated, the separation
of rights gives rise to the fiduciary relationship. The courts in
both Canada and the United States are engaged in a process of
defining the parameters of this relationship and the duties itimplies.
In order to understand the current developments regarding
this relationship, and assess the possible future direction it may
take, the historical background of both countries will be ex-
amined.
Aboriginal Land Title in the United States
As previously stated, the international law community pro-
vides little direction for governments to follow in dealing with
aboriginal peoples. Although both Congress and the executive
branch acknowledge the concept of a fiduciary relationship, the
concept evolved judicially.15 In attempting to determine the
boundaries of the relationship, courts fluctuate between estab-
lishing broad and narrow views of the duties involved. The
broader view regards the trust relationship as a moral obligation.
Essentially, this view puts the sovereign in a paternalistic role
under which the Indians, as charges, have legitimate expectancies
and desires which will be fulfilled by the "great white father."
The narrower view, in contrast, imposes a strict trustee-benefi-
ciary duty. The sovereign has an obligation similar to the fi-
duciary obligation a bank has in the administration of an estate.
Unfortunately, ascertaining which view a particular court es-
pouses is often difficult. Therefore, it is necessary to examine
the language of the court's holding and, to the extent possible,
the societal trends underlying the court's policy decisions. Opi-
nions in which a court imposes obligations on the trustee-
government usually espouse the narrower view; cases upholding
governmental power or dealing with third party rights often
espouse the broader view.
The judicial history of aboriginal rights in the United States
reflects the nation's attitudes as a whole. With few exceptions,
history illustrates that the judiciary has been hesitant in making
decisions regarding the relationship between the government and
the aboriginal peoples. Although early case law contains some
impressive statements regarding aboriginal rights and govern-
mental obligations, that same case law also reflects a degree of
suspicion and paternalism directed toward the aboriginal com-
15. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians,
27 STAN. L. Ray. 1213, 1213-48 (1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/8
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munity. Only recently have courts addressed the extent to which
Indian tribes can enforce fiduciary duties against the govern-
ment. Consequently, aboriginal land rights and governmental
obligations remain unsettled in American law.
The First Case in the Marshall Trilogy:
Johnson v. M'Intosh
The first major American statement dealing with aboriginal
title is the 1823 case of Johnson v. M'Intosh.'6 This case is the
starting point for any inquiry into the area of land titles in the
domestic as well as the international sphere. Johnson questioned
the ability of the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations to grant land
to private individuals. In 1773, the Illinois and Piankeshaw
nations granted land to a private individual. In 1775, the same
tribes granted the same land to the United States. The ultimate
issue was which grant was legally valid. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice John Marshall concluded that the original sale by
the Indians conveyed at most only the same right of occupancy
that the tribe possessed. Therefore, the original sale was legally
insignificant since the sovereign alone could extinguish title. The
later sale to the federal government was thus the valid grant.
Johnson presents the first judicial justification for the doctrine
of discovery.' 7 According to Justice Marshall, the British gov-
ernment asserted an absolute title to all lands occupied by the
Indians; title being vested in the United States as sovereign
successor to King George III and the United States succeeded
to Britain's claims.' 8 In a narrow holding, the Court acknowl-
edged the fiduciary relationship. Justice Marshall concluded that
the sovereign holds absolute legal title to the land, but the
Indians have a "legal as Well as a just claim to the land."' 9 The
Indians hold a legal right to their lands but the Court stressed
this right was valid against all except the sovereign.
The Second Case in the Marshall Trilogy.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,20 the Supreme Court assessed
the legal status of Indian tribes in the United States. The Court
held that Indian tribes are not the equivalent of foreign states
16. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
17. Chambers, supra note 15.
18. Erickson, supra note 4, at 109.
19. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
20. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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but rather "dependent domestic nations. ' 21 The holding empha-
sized that the United States asserts title independent of Indian
consent and that various tribes look to the federal government
for protection. According to the Court, the Indians have the
right to occupy and use their land subject to the overriding
interest of the federal government. The relationship is akin to
that of ward and guardian; the Indians are "in a state of
pupilage"2 2 requiring the guidance and wisdom of the federal
government. In effect, the Court imposes moral and social
obligations on the sovereign. The language regarding the federal-
tribal relationship, especially the analogy to a guardian-ward
situation, indicates a broad view of the fiduciary relationship.
The Third Case in the Marshall Trilogy:
Worcester v. Georgia
The third case in the Marshall trilogy, regarded as the foun-
dation of Indian law, is Worcester v. Georgia.2a Worcester
focused on the role of the state in conjunction with the power
of the sovereign regarding Indian tribes. In Worcester, a white
missionary entered the Cherokee reservation without obtaining
a license, in violation of a state statute. After a state court
conviction, the missionary challenged the state statute. The de-
terminative factor in the case was that the federal Constitution
granted exclusive control over Indian affairs to the federal gov-
ernment. The Court determined that the state statute was re-
pugnant to the supremacy clause of the Constitution and further,
that certain rights held by Indians were immune from interfer-
ence by the state. According to the Court, Indians comprise
"distinct political communities"24 able to exercise exclusive au-
thority in their own affairs within the boundaries of the reser-
vation.
Worcester illustrates the confusion of standards and erratic
results reached by the judiciary in attempting to define the
parameters and legal consequences of sovereign control over
Indian land. In dicta, the Court stated that it was difficult to
reconcile the doctrine of discovery, which gives the discovering
nation rights in the newly discovered territory and the preexisting
rights of the aboriginal peoples.2 Worcester indicates that the
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id.
23. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
24. Id. at 561.




United States has great power over the ownership of Indian
land, with the only limitation being that the sovereign cannot
extinguish Indian title without compensation, unless extinguish-
ment is a result of war. That is, conquering is a legitimate means
of extinguishment. 26 In Worcester, the Court adopted a narrow
view of the fiduciary relationship. The Court departed from the
existing case law when it viewed the primary method of land
acquisition as purchase.
The Marshall trilogy set the stage for the inception of the
plenary power era. With the end of treaty making by Congres-
sional fiat in 1871 came statutes designed to implement the new
policies embraced by the government, including allotment and
assimilation.27 The Court was forced to develop new rationales
for the justification of federal actions regarding Indians. The
overall goal was to obtain cessions of land and ensure peaceful
relations with the Indians. From these two concepts-property
interest and guardianship-the plenary power doctrine allowed
the federal government unrestrained power over the Indians.
The Plenary Power Era
During the plenary power era, federal policymakers denied
tribal Indians the basic freedoms accorded other American cit-
izens based on the theory that their relationship to the United
States was "an anomalous one and of a complex character." 29
Indian-imposed restraints on alienation, liquor sale and use
regulations, and contract rights affecting trust property were
made conditional upon approval by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.30 Congressional power over Indians seemed immune from
judicial interference. In fact, no Supreme Court has ever inval-
idated an act of Congress as being beyond the scope of federal
power over Indian affairs.3 ' The Court established a practice of
upholding the plenary power because of the Indians' "condition
of dependency," which somehow subjected Indian property to
the administrative control of the federal government. 32 This
authority permitted Congress, acting through the Secretary of
the Interior, to lease, sell or allot any tribal land without the
26. Sanders, supra note 7, at 318.
27. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scopes and Limitations, 132
U. PA. L. Rnv. 194, 199 (1984) [hereinafter Federal Power].
28. Id.
29. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886).
30. Federal Power, supra note 27, at 209.
31. Chambers, supra note 15, at 1213.
32. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 488 (1899).
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consent of the tribe, even in violation of treaty promises.
While the plenary power doctrine was useful in settling claims,
judicial misinterpretation resulted in virtually unreviewable fed-
eral power over Indian lands. Case law indicates a progression
from viewing the government's interest as a preemptive right to
purchase tribal land to a title interest, resulting in mere posses-
sion rights in the tribe. Viewed this way, it is possible to regard
ownership of land alone as giving the government the power to
govern Indians.
One of the most unexpected and damaging misinterpretations
of the plenary power doctrine is found in the case of Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States.33 This case presented the issue of
whether aboriginal ownership conferred any legal or equitable
rights against the government. Relying on questionable legal
precedent, Justice Reed concluded that Indian title rights were
merely possessory: they did not represent a property interest
which required compensation when extinguished. The Court held
that absent Congressional recognizance of an Indian right to
live on the land by treaty or other specific legislation, no com-
pensable property right existed 4 The Court reasoned that dis-
covery extinguished all Indian title; therefore, aboriginal title
represented permissible occupation given by the sovereign, not
ownership.
Following the Marshall Court era came wide judicial reaf-
firmance of the basic tenets of the plenary power doctrine. None
of the decisions seem to support the holding of Tee-Hit-Ton.35
The harsh language of the opinion may reflect fiscal consider-
ations of huge damage awards rather than sound policy.36 The
decision requires reevaluation; it is an aberration that continues
to threaten the rights of Native Americans.
Gradually, the policy began to shift in favor of protection of
tribal cultures and encouragement of tribal self government.
Toward this end, the Court became increasingly receptive to
Indian claims. In effect, the judiciary began to acknowledge the
special nature of the relationship between the government and
the aboriginal community.
Development of the Enforceable Trust
Since the federal government holds most Indian land in trust,
courts are fairly receptive to governmental regulation of Indian
33. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
34. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal 7tle Reconsidered, 31
HAsnwas L.J. 1216 (1980).




affairs in terms of land management.3 7 In turn, tribes consis-
tently seek to establish an enforceable trust relationship where
the federal exercise of power gives rise to correlative responsi-
bilities. As more Indian claims reached the judiciary, the Court
began to narrow and redefine the plenary power doctrine. Grad-
ually, the Court began to impose duties on the government to
responsibly manage Indian land and resources. But the plenary
power doctrine was not expunged. The breach of trust cases do
not challenge the authority of the government to manage and
control property. Instead, they argue that such power imposes
duties, the breach of which are remediable.
Many of the early cases regarding mismanagement of trust
property contain appealing fact patterns. Due to its expansive-
ness, tribal land is of significant economic value. Moreover, the
Indians' spiritual affinity with the land is often in direct conflict
with the government's expansion and profit motives. Several of
the early cases are a result of the termination legislation prevalent
in the 1950s which attempted to terminate the special relationship
between certain tribes and the government."' In short, this leg-
islation forced assimilation, granted states jurisdiction (including
taxing power), ended Indian entitlement to federal programs and
provided for the sale of Indian property with provisions for
division of profits among tribal members.39 Many claims arose
from these provisions resulting in increasingly expansive duties
imposed on the government and the granting of equitable relief
to the Indians.
In Navajo Tribe v. United States,40 the government was held
liable for the assignment of a lease it had supervised for the
tribe for nominal consideration when the assignor had an-
nounced its intention to surrender the lease to the tribe. The
court likened the situation to a "fiduciary who learns of an
opportunity, prevents the beneficiary from getting it and seizes
it for himself. ' 41 Taking a broad view of both the source and
the scope of the government's duties, the court reasoned that
the case was analogous to private trust law and imposed on the
government a "special duty of care regarding the property." 42
In Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,43 the Court held
that the Secretary of the Interior violated his duty to the tribe
37. Sanders, supra note 7, at 319.
38. Chambers, supra note 15, at 1216.
39. Federal Power, supra note 27, at 209.
40. 624 F.2d 981 (1980).
41. Id., 624 F.2d at 987.
42. Id. at 988.
43. 499 F.2d 1095, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975).
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to keep the lake full in order to protect the Bureau of Recla-
mation's interest in diverting water as part of an irrigation
project. The Secretary of the Interior made a "judgment call"
in assessing and balancing the respective needs of the parties.
The Court determined such arbitrariness to be inappropriate and
miscalculated.44
The significant aspect of Morton is that the duty was not
found in a statute or treaty provision. The court relied on case
law to impose a duty of loyalty on the Secretary of the Interior.
The holding seems to require the subordination of non-Indian
federal activity to Indian property interests in the event of
conflict.
The Navajo Tribe and Morton courts construe statutes lib-
erally in order to establish a trust relationship. The fiduciary
duties of the government are analogized to private trust law to
afford a remedy for the Indians. The following case, United
States v. Mitchell,45 does not adhere to the liberal construction
of Navajo Tribe and Morton.
As part of the termination legislation, the Allotment Act was
passed whereby allotments of land were made to Indian tribes
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The
policy was an administrative disaster and many claims resulted.
In United States v. Mitchell [Mitchell I], the Quinault Indians
received an allotment of land so dense with timber it could only
be used for forestry, a practical impossibility given the limited
acreage allotted. In addition, even if the tribe organized and
entered the timber industry, they could not sell the timber
without the federal government's consent. Beginning in 1910,
Congress authorized the Bureau of Indian Affairs to contract
for the sale of timber on allotted land and to manage the
business of harvesting, selling and replanting the timber. 46 The
Quinaults alleged mismanagement of resources and the trust
fund derived from those resources. Specifically, the Quinaults
alleged that the government failed to obtain fair market value
for the timber and for rights of way granted across Indian land,
and failed to invest the trust fund money.
A breach of trust suit was filed in 1971 and the Court of
Claims, relying on the Allotment Act, held that the United
States does and will hold the land thus allotted in trust for the
sole use and benefit of the Indians.47 The court adopted a liberal
44. Trust Relationship, supra note 3, at 651.
45. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
46. Trust Relationship, supra note 3, at 651.
47. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/8
construction of the statute and relied on common law principles
of trust to impose a fiduciary relationship on the government.
The Supreme Court reversed. In direct contradiction to the
Court of Claims liberal construction, the Supreme Court re-
quired strict interpretation of the statute and held that only a
very limited trust was created. The Court noted that the Allot-
ment Act "does not unambiguously provide that the United
States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the
management of allotted lands."'4 The trust was only effective
to prevent alienation of land and provide immunity from state
taxation. The Indians were held to have no ownership rights
sufficient to treat timber as an income producing resource,
therefore they had no enforceable claim. 49
United States v. Mitchell [Mitchell II10 interpreted the specific
legislation regarding forest management that the Supreme Court
held was not properly before it in Mitchell L The word "trust"
is not used specifically but on remand, the Court relied on the
incident of government supervision and control of Indian prop-
erty to liberally construe the statute reasoning that "this long
continuing doctrine of government fiduciary obligation in the
management and operation of the forest lands with which In-
terior was entrusted" 5' created a trust relationship. Moreover,
the creation of the duty necessarily mandates compensation for
breach. But the Court went further. The holding requires the
government to obtain the greatest revenue from the timber and
thus contemplates damages for the difference between the actual
proceeds and the greatest revenue possible through effective
management.- Without this construction, Indians had no rem-
edy where the government failed to obtain fair market value or
failed to make timely payments.
The Supreme Court held in Mitchell II that the trust duty
arose from several statutes and required the Secretary to manage
forests on Indian lands. The Court concluded that "a fiduciary
relationship necessarily arises when the government assumes such
elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indi-
ans." 53 The holding still requires some sort of statutory trust,
however broad the construction.
48. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542.
49. Id.
50. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
51. Id. at 225.
52. Trust Relationship, supra note 3, at 663.
53. Mitchell I, 463 U.S. at 225.
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The importance of Mitchell I lies in its expanse. The opinion
indicates an increased willingness to hold the federal government
responsible. In establishing a trust claim, if there is evidence of
any legislative authority for Interior Department supervision or
control over Indian property or money and if the Secretary does
exercise pervasive authority, a general fiduciary relationship will
be found. Even broadly worded statutes will suffice if actual
management has taken place. In addition, once the relationship
has been established, a determination of breach of trust duties
may be found in specific legislation, liberal construction of
indefinite statutes or general common law principles of trust.
One question remains: whether a trust relationship will be found
in the absence of a statute.
Aboriginal Land Rights in Canada
For a variety of reasons, the scope of Indian rights is less
firmly established in Canada than in the United States.5 4 There
are fewer cases, because of Canada's efforts to avoid litigation
in favor of negotiated settlements, and because of the attitudes
of the Canadian society as a whole. In fact, there is a broad
consensus in Canada that previous governmental policies denied
aboriginals their rights, giving rise to legitimate claims against
the state.55 In response to that consensus, the government of
Canada is firmly committed to negotiation and settlement of
land claims.
Contemporary negotiation of aboriginal and treaty rights in
Canada takes place against a historical record of social trends,
treaties, constitutional enactments and landmark decisions by
the Canadian Supreme Court. Therefore, an analysis of the
social, legislative and judicial history is imperative to understand
and define the policies underlying Canada's relationship with its
aboriginal community.
Social History
The Canadian Indian population is a significant proportion
of the population as a whole. The aboriginal groups consist of
approximately ten linguistic groups with fifty-eight dialects scat-
tered in six recognized cultural regions.5 Indians comprise 5%
54. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763: A Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of
Federal Stale Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B.U.L. Rnv. 329
(1989).




of the total population, aboriginal ancestry being reported by
almost half a million Canadians in the 1981 census.57 Of these,
there are 300,000 Indians registered and thus entitled to various
benefits from the Canadian government.
5 8
In terms of social history, Canadians pride themselves on
their tolerance. Canada has always retained civil, if not cordial
relations with the United Kingdom, unlike the United States'
temperamental relationship with the Crown.5 9 Moreover, Canada
is immensely proud of the fact that "no Indians were con-
quered" but rather they were peacefully brought within the
ambit of the sovereign.6 In fact, Canada maintains no cohesive
theory to explain "just when and how the native peoples of
Canada were won to the allegiance of the Crown and what
effect this process had on their original land rights, customary
laws and system of government. ' 61 Nevertheless, Canadians do
admit that there have been some inequities.
Before World War II, Indians were overwhelmingly consid-
ered second class citizens. They were denied the vote, were
prohibited from having access to liquor, and had separate and
unequal schools. 62 Beginning in the postwar era, the policies and
attitudes toward aboriginals began to change. This was partly a
reaction to the distinguished wartime service provided by Indi-
ans. While the country had always maintained fairly good re-
lations with the aboriginals, the public now clearly favored
expanding their rights. The process, however, was slow. The
phasing out of the liquor laws occurred gradually; the federal
vote was ultimately obtained in 1960.63 Finally, the early 1970s
brought about a dramatic increase in litigation especially in-
volving hunting and fishing rights." In addition, the constitu-
tion, as amended in 1982, contains provisions directly addressing
and recognizing aboriginal rights. Presently, the government is
vigorously pursuing a course of settlement and negotiation in
dealing with land claims. Canada remains deeply committed to
the practice of negotiation as opposed to litigation in response
to aboriginal land claim disputes.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Slattery, supra note 6, at 361.
60. Sanders, supra note 7, at 319.
61. Id. at 321.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 323.
64. Id. at 320.
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Legislative History: The Royal Proclamation
The basis for almost all land title disputes in Canada is found
in the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The doc-
ument reflects Britain's desire to curry favor with the Indians.
The Proclamation declared a huge area of the country to be
Indian territory and forbade purchases or settlements of that
land, absent specific leave from the Crown. In effect, a legal
burden existed against the Crown's ultimate title until such time
as the Indians surrendered their interest. 65 No settlement of land
could occur until Indian rights had been absorbed by the Crown
through negotiations with the aboriginal community. Subsequent
judicial interpretation holds that the Proclamation imposed a
requirement of voluntary surrender assented to by a majority of
the electors and accepted by the governing body of the reserve.
The terms of the Proclamation have never been repealed and
it is still considered good law. Although it must be read in light
of later developments, the Proclamation continues to form a
principle basis for aboriginal land claims in many areas. 66
Legislative History: Treaties
Treaties are another method of recognizing and reserving
aboriginal rights. The Proclamation required voluntary cession
by the Indians, and Canada needed to obtain reserve lands for
settlement. The making of treaties achieved both objectives.
Treaties enable the Crown to clear land of aboriginal title so
that settlement or resource development could proceed. The
government began signing treaties in the late 1800s and continued
until the early 1920s, although amendments to existing treaties
were signed up until the 1950s. 67 Initially, cash payments were
made for surrender, however, the Crown later set aside reserve
land and provided benefits for the surrendering Indians. It is
important to note that unlike the United States, where treaties
have been congressionally prohibited since 1871, Canada has
not declared an end to treaty making.69
There is little formal law regarding treaties, but they are held
by the Canadian government to have the same force as domestic
law. In the beginning of the 20th century, the federal government
assumed unilateral legislative authority over the Indians and
65. Clinton, supra note 54.
66. Id.
67. Sanders, supra note 7, at 323.
68. Henderson, supra note 1, at 175.
69. Sanders, supra note 7, at 322.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/8
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thereby undercut the significance of treaties as a basis for claims.70
Tribes vigorously opposed this and continued to assert the sig-
nificance of aboriginal title claims. This led to intensive nego-
tiations regarding land claims. In effect, treaty making has been
reincarnated as land claim negotiations.
Legislative History: The Constitution
Another basis for recognizing and reserving aboriginal land
rights is found in the Canadian constitution. This constitution
specifically provides for aboriginal rights and reflects doctrinal
ambitions first articulated in the Royal Proclamation and sub-
sequently incorporated into the Constitution Act of 1867; the
Manitoba Act of 1870; Rupert's Land and North Western Ter-
ritory Order; and the Ontario and Quebec Boundaries Extension
Acts of 1912.'
The constitution contains important provisions that specifi-
cally relate to aboriginal peoples. Section 35 recognizes and
affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights but does not sub-
stantially enhance them. It effectively prevents the nonconsensual
extinguishment of title by other than a constitutional enactment
or statutory scheme. Section 37 provides for a process whereby
proposals for additional rights are examined by the first minis-
ters. The constitutional committee considered and ultimately
rejected a clause requiring consent by the Indians to amendments
directly affecting them. Despite the absence of such a clause,
there is a tradition of consultation prior to changes.72
The constitution makes an important distinction between ex-
isting rights and additional rights. Section 35 exhibits tremendous
potential. It confirms the doctrine of aboriginal rights by pro-
viding that the rights survive acquisition by the Crown, unless
incompatible with the Crown's title or modified by statute. 73
Most significantly, the constitutional provisions are a commit-
ment to the future well being of the aboriginals and an acknow-
ledgment of the historical role the Natives played in Canada.
Judicial History
One of the earliest cases dealing with aboriginal rights in
Canada specifically relied on the Royal Proclamation. St. Cath-
erine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen74 involved the
70. Henderson, supra note 1, at 175.
71. Sanders, supra note 7, at 317.
72. Id.
73. Slattery, supra note 6, at 364.
74. 13 S.C.R. 557 (1887), 144 App. D.C. 46 (1888).
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surrender of lands in Ontario under an 1873 treaty. The issue
before the Privy Council was "whether certain lands admittedly
situated within the boundaries of Ontario belonged to that
province or to the Dominion of Canada."7 5 The Court held in
favor of the province of Ontario. In Canada, due to the gov-
ernmental infrastructure, provinces traditionally have more power
over Indians than the federal government. The crucial aspect of
the decision is its discussion of land rights. The Court held that
Canadian Indians have a "personal and usufructuary right,
dependent on the goodwill of the government" to the use of
their land.76 The Court characterized the interest held by the
Crown as the "substantial and paramount estate underlying the
Indian title."7' In the course of the opinion, the Court cited
with approval the doctrine of discovery first articulated in M'In-
tosh stating that "all our instruments recognize the absolute title
of the Crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."' 78
More than eighty years elapsed before a case addressing ab-
original rights came before the Supreme Court of Canada. The
growth of Indian activism in the post-World War II era began
to force Canadian law to address the Indians' concerns. 79 In the
years 1969 to 1973, Indian activism was at an all-time high.8 0
During this time, litigation involving Indians increased dramat-
ically, especially in the areas of hunting and fishing rights.81
Canada adopted a general policy of vigorous negotiation, as
opposed to litigation in respect to land claims in Northern
Quebec, British Columbia and the Northern Territories. 2 Against
this backdrop of favorable public opinion of Indians and Indian
rights, Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia3 pro-
gressed through the Canadian courts. Calder is an important
land title case, significant not for its outcome, but for its impact.
It is largely considered to be victory in the course of aboriginal
rights, albeit a political victory, not a legal one.
In Calder, the Nishga Indian Band brought an action seeking
a declaration that the tribe's aboriginal title had never been
extinguished. The action involved over one thousand square
75. Id., 144 App. D.C. at 51-52.
76. Id., 144 App. D.C. at 54.
77. Id., 144 App. D.C. at 55.
78. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 557 (1823).
79. Erickson, supra note 4, at 112.
80. Id. at 130.
81. Henderson, supra note 1, at 180.
82. Slattery, supra note 6, at 368.
83. 34 D.L.R. 3d. 145 (Can. 1973).
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miles that had been occupied by the Nishgas since time imme-
morial. The government did not claim that the tribe had sur-
rendered their interest by treaty or otherwise. Rather, the
government based its claim on implied extinguishment by virtue
of nine proclamations by the Royal Governor and four ordi-
nances passed by the governor in council.
The Indians lost at trial and on appeal, but a deeply divided
Supreme Court was unable to decide if aboriginal title had been
extinguished. Three Supreme Court judges held that the title
was extinguished,14 three held that there had been no extinguish-
ment, 85 and three held that dismissal was proper for lack of fiat
to sue the government. 6 Despite this split, the case was a major
breakthrough in terms of recognition of aboriginal land title
rights because all of the opinions agreed that land title rights
were preexisting rights, not dependent on the Royal Proclama-
tion.Y
The opinion which held that aboriginal title had been extin-
guished relied on St. Catherine's to determine that the right of
the sovereign is absolute, requiring no compensation or expla-
nation. In effect, the Court reasoned that extinguishment was a
nonjusticiable act by the sovereign. 88
The dissent in Calder recognized that title was extinguishable
at the discretion of the sovereign but maintained that a rebutt-
able presumption was raised in favor of continued aboriginal
title once established. Therefore, once the Nishga came under
British sovereignty, the title could only be extinguished by sur-
render to the Crown.8 9
Calder expands the concept of aboriginal title by recognition
of the preexistence of the right. In this, the case goes beyond
St. Catherine's by acknowledging that the Royal Proclamation
is not the sole source of aboriginal title. Therefore, a fiduciary
relationship exists not by legislative affirmance but rather as a
result of continued occupation and possession. The Court cited
the decisions in Johnson and Worcester to attempt to define the
boundaries of the fiduciary relationship. 90 While considered a
victory due to the acknowledgment of aboriginal rights, Calder's
84. Id. at 148-68.
85. Id. at 168-223.
86. Id. at 223-26.
87. Erickson, supra note 4, at 130.
88. Calder, 34 D.L.R. 3d at 150-52.
89. Erickson, supra note 4, at 133.
90. Calder, 34 D.L.R. 3d at 151.
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split decision and the ultimate settlement of the Nishga claim
led to a confusion of standards and uncertain results.
The most recent and perhaps most significant case in the area
of aboriginal rights is Guerin v. The Queen.9' Guerin is a breach
of trust suit arising out of the leasing of reservation lands to a
third party. Guerin is considered to be the most progressive of
the aboriginal cases. It has had an enormous impact in estab-
lishing and expanding aboriginal rights.
The facts are: in 1955, officials of the Indian Affairs Branch
proposed a lease of approximately 160 acres of the Musqueam
Indian Reserve in Vancouver. The Musqueam Band consented
to an appraisal and officials began negotiations with the Shaugh-
nessy Heights Golf Club of Vancouver. The actual lease proposal
was not submitted to the band, although its general terms were
outlined. The appraiser was unaware of the'proposed terms of
the lease. Based on the information provided, the Band agreed
to lease the land for a certain annual rent. The Band maintained
and the Court agreed that the rent applied to an initial term of
fifteen years with the lease being renewable for six ten-year
terms thereafter, the rent being negotiable for each renewable
term. In fact, the lease provided for four fifteen-year renewal
terms subject to a 15% maximum increase during the first
renewal term. This ambiguity resulted in substantial disparity in
terms of economic returns on the property.
The case raised a question of first impression in Canada:
whether the Musqueam Indians could recover damages from the
government as a result of a breach of trust agreement. The
Band demonstrated that the Band, the appraiser, and the golf
club had different information; that given the true information,
the Band would not have agreed to surrender; that the Indians'
repeated requests for a copy of the lease were ignored for more
than a decade; and that the actual lease did not conform to the
terms discussed with the band.
The government argued that the Indians had no legal rights
whatsoever, that any trust relationship was of a political, not a
legal nature, and therefore judicially unenforceable. In response,
the Court held that the Band's property interest was a preexisting
right, not created by the Royal Proclamation or by any other
executive order or legislative provision. Therefore, Indian rights
of occupation and possession were undisturbed by European
colonization or the colonist's claims of sovereignty. Hence, their
claim was not the subject matter of a political trust since the
91. 13 D.L.R. 4th 321 (Can. 1984).
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interest was limited by the nature of Indian title. The Indians
had an independent legal interest; therefore, the Crown's duty
was not merely a public law duty and therefore unenforceable.
Nor was it a private law duty in the strict sense. The right was
not beneficial, nor was it a "personal, usufructuary right."
Instead, the Court determined that, based on the fact of inal-
ienability, the relationship was sui generis; the interest of the
Indians was such that it gave rise "upon surrender to a distinc-
tive fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown to deal with
the land for the benefit of the surrendering Indians." 92
The Court determined that in obtaining, without consultation,
a much less valuable lease than that promised, the government
had breached its duty of trust through fraud and concealment. 9-
Damages were assessed by analogy to trust law and $10 million
dollars was awarded to the Band.94 The Band also alleged failure
on the part of the Crown to exercise the requisite care and
management as trustee, but the Court did not specifically address
this issue. Therefore, the question is left open whether, absent
fraud, the result would have been the same.
The significance of the holding in Guerin cannot be over-
stated. Principally, the case is extraordinary due to the fact that
it imposed fiduciary obligations in favor of Indians. In addition,
Guerin is the first clear decision in Canadian law that Indian
rights arise from preexisting indigenous legal order and not from
a common law doctrine or an affirming action by the legislature.
Following Calder, the holding in Guerin significantly ex-
panded the concept that Indians have legal redress in the courts
of Canada for their grievances, including land claims. While the
government has vigorously pursued a course in negotiation of
land claims, it was a very important victory for the Indians to
realize that the courts were also open to them. The holding was
an open acknowledgement of access to legal redress.
Comparison of United States and Canadian Law
Significantly, the Guerin Court never cited Mitchell. While at
first glance the decisions appear to be incongruous, in fact they
are not wholly divergent. Mitchell effectively holds that given a
statute, and actual management by the Secretary of the Interior,
liberal construction will be employed to establish a fiduciary
relationship. Guerin is more expansive, imposing the obligations
92. Id. at 339 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 344.
94. Id. at 345.
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of a trust relationship on the government based on historical
equity. The obligation arises out of the preexistence of aboriginal
title. However, both decisions reflect an increased willingness
on the part of the judiciary to hold the government responsible
to the aboriginal community. In both the United States and
Canada, there is evidence of increased facility in establishing
the existence of a trust relationship and an expansion of the
scope of the obligations of the government.
Ultimately, the desirability of recognizing a cause of action
for breach of trust relates to whether legal remedies provide
adequate protection for Indian rights. That is, awarding damages
may frustrate the purpose of the trust-to maintain a separate
Indian culture. 'Specific performance of a federal trust relies
upon a connection between a resource base and a goal of
maintaining separate and identifiable cultures. Nevertheless, the
extent to which the fiduciary relationship is enforceable against
the government has fueled controversy.
Conclusion
In any land claim case, the odds favor the government's
interest. The disparity in resources and information tends to
favor the state. In contrast, the odds are against aboriginal
peoples who maintain such strong and spiritual ties to their land
but are, in comparison, politically powerless. The community is
inherently unique, maintaining a separate culture and exercising
inherent governmental powers yet having none of the rights
accorded states. Therefore, their interests necessitate sensitivity
and sincerity. Canada is aware of the needs of the aboriginal
community and has responded well. Legislatively, the progress
in defining and maintaining the parameters of the fiduciary
relationship is admirable. Judicially, Guerin significantly departs
from precedent and perhaps indicates a new era of judicial
activism in land claims.
Much of substantive law is still being formed in Canada. The
volume of cases is rising geometrically. As more and more
diverse claims are asserted and a growing sensitivity to aboriginal
rights is observed, the parameters of the fiduciary relationship
are being confirmed and expanded. The principle that native
peoples have the right to use and occupy the lands they have
occupied since time immemorial is undisputed. The protection
of these rights is the obligation of the government by whose
providence they exist. Increasingly, the judiciary is willing to
acknowledge the existence of a trust relationship and impose
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol15/iss2/8
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higher standards of obligations on the government in discharge
of its duties. Aboriginals are no longer viewed as economically
disadvantaged or victims of discrimination. Rather, they are
looked upon as a significant percentage of the population who
have legitimate claims against the state. The judiciary is obligated
to enforce these rights by imposition of trust obligations on the
government.
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